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Abstract 
In February 2008, British Telecommunications (BT) introduced automatically 
renewing, or “rollover”, contracts into the UK market for fixed-voice telephone 
service.  These contracts included a 12-month Minimum Contract Period (MCP) 
with associated Early Termination Charges (ETCs).  Unless customers opted out, 
at the end of the 12 months they would automatically be rolled over into a new 
MCP and face new ETCs if they later wished to leave BT.  Using a unique, 
disaggregate, customer billing dataset, we measure the impact of rollover 
contracts on BT customers’ decision to switch to another provider.  We find 
that, controlling for the effects of tenure, broadband purchase, price 
discounts, and self-selection, rollover households switch after their first MCP 
34.8% (54.8%) less than comparable customers on standard plans (fixed-term 
contracts).  These imply rollover contracts induce switching costs on the order 
of 33.0% of the monthly price of the average BT fixed-voice telephone service.  
This raises significant concerns about the competitive effects of such contracts 
in media and telecommunications markets. 
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1 Introduction 
On 1 February 2008, British Telecommunications (BT), the largest provider of fixed-voice 
telephone service in the United Kingdom (UK), introduced an innovative contract offer to its 
residential customers.  Like many of the contracts offered by BT, this one offered a discount (of 
£2.99, or 21%) on the price of its Unlimited Evening and Weekend Plan during an initial, 12-
month Minimum Contract Period (MCP).  The innovation was an automatic renewal, or “rollover”, 
clause:  unless the customer contacted BT before the end of the contract, the terms of the 
contract would be automatically renewed for an additional 12 months.2  In this case, the 
customer would keep their discount, but would also be subject to a new MCP.  This came with a 
cost:  if a customer wished to switch providers during a MCP (either the first or subsequent), she 
would have to pay Early Termination Charges (ETCs) of £7.50—65% of the contract price—for each 
month left until the end of the current MCP. 
BT soon followed by introducing rollover contracts on all its fixed-voice residential telephone 
plans and began marketing them heavily.  Many customers found these attractive relative to BT’s 
existing fixed-term contracts and standard plans, and a significant portion of both new and 
existing customers signed up.3  At the same time, BT began introducing rollover contracts for 
residential broadband offers. 
There are several views in the economics literature on firms’ incentives to provide term 
contracts and their consequences in the marketplace.  BT argued that the contracts were 
efficient:  they lowered transactions costs for those customers happy to stay with BT indefinitely 
and reduced their (BT’s) marketing and customer service costs (BT, 2010, 2011).  The ETCs 
associated with term contracts, however, necessarily increase consumers’ “switching costs”.4  
Switching costs, in general, can introduce a “bargains-then-rip-offs” element into pricing, 
replacing competition period-by-period with competition for a buyer’s “lifecycle requirements” 
(Farrell and Klemperer (2007)). This need not imply social welfare losses, but can, for example 
due to consumers that are either myopic or make mistakes.  Contractual switching costs, in 
particular, can also discourage efficient entry by limiting the ability of a potential entrant to 
attract new consumers (Aghion and Bolton, 1987).   
The purpose of this study is to estimate the effect of BT’s rollover contracts on its customers’ 
decisions to switch to another provider of fixed voice telephone service. Working closely with 
staff at the Office of Communications (Ofcom), the UK media and telecommunications regulator, 
we obtained a unique, disaggregate, customer billing dataset from BT for a random sample of 
almost 180,000 of its fixed-line voice customers as of 31 December 2008.5  This data included 
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 About one month before each MCP expired, BT did send its customers a letter reminding them that, if they did not call 
BT to cancel the contract before the end of the MCP, they would be automatically rolled over into the next MCP. 
3
 BT’s standard plans were subject to neither contract conditions (MCPs or ETCs) nor discounts.  BT’s “fixed-term” 
contract offers were often identical to their rollover offers, except that at the end of the MCP these customers 
automatically migrated to a standard plan. 
4
 In the canonical survey of the literature, Farrell and Klemperer (2007, p.1972) say “A product has classic switching costs 
if a buyer will purchase it repeatedly and will find it costly to switch from one seller to another [during that series].”  
5
 As noted in the acknowledgements, the analysis in this paper formed the basis of a report delivered to Ofcom in August 
2010.  In light of that report and additional evidence, Ofcom decided to propose an amendment to the “General 
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information about each household’s history with BT as well as their voice plan, contract, price 
paid (including any discounts), and minimum contract period(s) as of this date and for 15 
subsequent months (through 31 March 2010).6 We augmented this with aggregate market-wide 
information measuring macroeconomic trends and prices offered by rival providers for similar 
services. The result was a comprehensive dataset ideal for analysing the effects of contract 
terms on switching behaviour at the level of the individual household.  To our knowledge, ours is 
one of the first papers to use such detailed, disaggregate, billing data to analyze household 
switching behaviour in product markets. 
We use this data to specify and estimate a recursive bivariate probit model designed to measure 
the causal effect of rollover contracts on switching behaviour controlling for a host of other 
factors that might influence switching, including tenure (i.e., how long a customer has been with 
BT), whether the customer purchases other services from BT (e.g. broadband access), and the 
effect of any price discounts. Due to the highly disaggregate nature of our data, identification of 
most of these effects is straightforward.  It is most challenging for prices, but we are able to 
exploit variation in the presence and size of price discounts associated with different rollover 
offers presented by BT to accurately identify the separate effects of discounts from the other 
contract terms.  We also exploit the timing of households’ decisions to account for “self-
selection” (or just “selection”), unobserved differences in households’ likelihood of switching 
that might be correlated with their decision to select a rollover contract.   
We focus our analysis on measuring the impact of rollover contracts in the months after the 
initial 12-month MCP, as this is the period for which the terms in rollover contracts differ from 
BT’s existing, fixed-term, contract offers.  We find that all of tenure, broadband purchase, and 
price discounts are statistically and economically important determinants of households’ 
switching behaviour.  We further find statistical evidence of self-selection, although its economic 
effects are tiny.  Most important, we find that, controlling for all these effects, households on 
BT’s rollover contracts switch after their first MCP 34.8% less than comparable customers on 
standard plans and by 54.8% less than comparable customers on BT’s fixed-term contracts.  
These imply rollover contracts induce switching costs on the order of 33.0% of the monthly price 
of the average BT fixed-voice telephone service.  This raises significant concerns about the 
competitive effects of such contracts both in this market and in media and telecommunications 
markets more generally. 
The analysis in this paper relates to a growing empirical literature measuring the effects of 
switching costs, often in media and telecommunications markets. The majority of this literature 
looks at the demand side and tries to measure the welfare consequences of switching costs; 
recent papers have begun to tackle competitive (supply-side) effects as well. On the demand-
side, Crawford and Shum (2005) estimate the effects of uncertainty, learning, and risk aversion 
(the combination of which induce switching costs) in the market for anti-ulcer drugs, finding 
eliminating uncertainty reduces market concentration and increases welfare by 8%.7 Shcherbakov 
(2007) estimates switching costs in U.S. pay television markets and finds them to be between 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
 
Conditions,” under which all UK communications providers offer service, that prohibits “opt-out” processes for MCP 
renewal.  See http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/consultations/arcs for more information.   
6
 The data were anonymized to protect customer privacy:  we observed no customer names or addresses, only a unique 
household identifier and their postcode as of the sampling date. 
7
 Goettler and Clay (2011) similarly find that uncertainty and learning in combination with fixed fees to change tariffs 
introduce switching costs (and “flat-rate bias”) for customers of an online grocer. 
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$100-200, roughly 3-6 times the monthly cost of the average service. On the supply side, Viard 
(2007) finds that reduced switching costs make markets more competitive in U.S. long-distance 
telephone service while Dubé, Hitsch and Rossi (2009) find the opposite: increasing brand 
loyalty/state-dependent utility (that is, switching costs) in the (differentiated) markets for 
orange juice and margarine make markets more competitive. 
The study most closely related to ours is a recent analysis by Handel (2010) of switching costs 
and adverse selection in the choice of U.S. health insurance plans.  He, too, has access to 
detailed, disaggregate, customer billing data and observes household choices over time.8,9 He 
finds, holding plan prices fixed, that eliminating switching costs would improve consumer choices 
and increase welfare by 10%.  Allowing prices to change, however, exacerbates problems of 
adverse selection and lowers welfare.  The nature of the products being sold, consumer purchase 
habits, and market structure all appear to be important factors driving the variation in measured 
effects of switching costs, suggesting accurate modelling of the specific market under study is 
necessary for obtaining reliable inferences about their magnitudes and effects. 
The rest of this report is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe the detailed customer-
level data we collected from BT to measure the impact of rollover contracts on the propensity of 
their customers to switch to another provider. We make a point of demonstrating the raw 
patterns in the data that will subsequently identify our causal effects of interest. In Section 3, 
we introduce the econometric models used to estimate the effect of rollover contracts on 
switching. We highlight how we control for determinants of switching behaviour other than 
rollover contracts and specify a model of rollover contract choice designed to control for the 
self-selection of households into such contracts based on unobserved differences in their 
willingness to switch. Section 4 presents our results and Section 5 concludes. 
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 Dubé, Hitsch and Rossi (2009) and Dubé, Hitsch, Rossi, and Vitorino (2008) also use disaggregate household panel data, 
but study choices in frequently purchased consumer products (butter and orange juice) based on market survey panels.  
While such data are valuable, customer data like that used in this paper and in Handel (2010) are often superior in size 
and in the baseline information provided about customers. 
9
 Even better, the characteristics of his products change frequently over time, so that an option that is attractive in one 
year may become dominated in the next year.  That a large number of his customers continue to enroll in dominated 
plans (likely due to default bias) provides demonstrable (and quantifiable) evidence of switching costs in his context. 
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2 Data 
The primary dataset used in this paper is detailed customer information provided to us by BT 
from their internal billing database.  It was collected in collaboration with Ofcom and BT under 
the powers provided Ofcom by Section 135 of the UK Communications Act 2003 (“S135 Data 
Request”).  We also collected price data from BT and other communications providers (CPs) and 
aggregate macroeconomic variables.  We describe each of these datasets in turn. 
2.1 Disaggregate BT customer data 
2.1.1 Sampling plan 
An important aspect of the data collection was the design of the sampling plan. We requested BT 
to provide customer-level information on a subset of 180,000 customers randomly drawn from 
the population of individuals that were BT customers on 31 December 2008.10 We call this date 
the sampling date. We further asked BT to report the product choices of these customers from 1 
January 2007 (or when they joined BT, if later) until the end of the observation period, on 31 
March 2010 (or when they left BT, if earlier). 
This type of sampling is called stock sampling as it consists of sampling from the stock of 
customers at a given point of time.11 It is common in the economic analysis of duration (or 
survival) data (Wooldridge, 2002, and Jenkins, 2004). We adopt stock sampling because this 
scheme is simpler to implement than flow sampling and because many BT customers are long-
term customers, the effects on whom we might miss if we were to use flow sampling. 
The sampling date was chosen to strike a balance between observing long histories (from the 
sampling date until the end of the observation period) and having a significant fraction of the 
population on automatically renewable contracts (which were introduced in February 2008). The 
sample size was chosen to be large enough to allow us to precisely estimate the effects of 
interest. 
2.1.2 Variables 
Before describing the variables collected, we define some relevant terms and concepts: 
• The sampling date is the date on which BT sampled from their database to provide the 
data used in this study.  It is 31 December 2008; 
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 A BT customer is an individual who both rents a telephone line and purchases calls from BT.  This definition does not 
include individuals that only rent the line from BT and purchase calls from a rival CP. 
11
 The primary alternative to stock sampling is flow sampling which would sample from customers as they enter the BT 
customer database over a specified period of time. 
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• The observation period is the time period for which we obtained BT customer data (1 
January 2009 to 31 March 2010); 
• A customer’s BT start date is the month in which the individual became a BT customer 
(e.g., July 2008); 
• If a customer leaves BT, her BT switching date is the date on which she leaves BT. A 
customer leaves BT when he or she ceases to rent the line from BT; 
• If a customer does not leave BT, her censoring date is the latest date for which her 
customer information is available (e.g., March 2010); 
• A BT promotion is a particular combination of plan (e.g. Evenings and Weekends), 
contract (e.g. rollover), price discounts (if any), and additional phone services (if any) to 
which a customer subscribes at a point in time;12 
• We refer to the set of promotions featuring a fixed-term or a rollover contract as fixed-
term or rollover contracts, respectively; 
• We refer to customers on promotions featuring a fixed-term or a rollover contract as 
fixed-term or rollover customers, respectively; 
• The sampling-date promotion is the promotion which the customer was on at the 
sampling date; 
• Previous promotions and subsequent promotions are promotions (if any) that the 
customer was on previous to and/or following their sampling-date promotion. 
We collected three main categories of information from BT: information on dates, information on 
promotions, and other (aggregate) information. 
Date Information: 
• BT start date;  
• Start date for the sampling-date promotion; 
• Switching or censoring date, as appropriate. 
Plan information for the sampling-date, previous, and subsequent promotions: 
• Plan identifier (UWP, UEWP, UAP);13 
                                                 
 
 
12
The use of the word “promotion” suggests limited duration and it is indeed the case that (a) the set of promotions 
available to new and existing BT customers varies over time; and (b) certain characteristics of a promotion (for example, 
a discount on the price of a plan) may not be permanent. However, once a customer starts a BT promotion, that 
customer remains on the same promotion until she moves to a different promotion or she switches away from BT. 
Promotions that do not have any contracts are called standard plans (or standard contracts). 
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• Contract identifier (Standard plan/None, Fixed-term, Rollover); 
• Information on prices and ETCs; 
• MCP information (None, 12-month fixed-term, 18-month fixed-term, 12-month rollover). 
Other Information:  
• Subscription to other BT services (i.e., broadband and BT Vision) at the sampling date; 
• Customer postcode at the sampling date. 
2.1.3 The estimation sample 
The raw dataset provided to us by BT had 519,168 observations on 179,957 customers. An 
observation was a customer-promotion, i.e. the specific BT promotion under which that 
customer was being provided service for every promotion held by the customer between 1 
January 2007 and 31 March 2010 (or the date they left BT). BT also provided a data dictionary 
that permitted matching the promotion for each customer to a set of characteristics of that 
promotion, notably plan type, contract type, and any price discounts or additional services 
included in the promotion. 
The matching process was imperfect. Some customers had promotion codes that were not in the 
data dictionary, some promotion codes in the data dictionary were not associated with any 
customers, and other promotions were associated with more than one code. Furthermore, as 
some customers have been with BT since the 1930s, there were many old and/or redundant 
promotion codes. 
In constructing the estimation dataset, we balanced the goals of including as many BT customers 
as possible in the analysis against the costs of including erroneous and/or tracking down 
mismatched data. We first excluded customers that were on old, “grandfathered”, promotion 
codes (related to BT Together Local, BT Working Together, etc.) for which it was relatively costly 
to obtain the associated plan, contract, and price-discount information. This eliminated 18,341, 
or 10.2%, of the original sample. Further customers were lost due to their dropping BT for calls 
but keeping it for line rental (10,352, or 5.8%) and due to their having holes or overlaps in their 
choice history (5,964, or 3.3%). Overall, the estimation sample contains 144,861 customers, or 
80.5% of the original BT sample. Appendix 4 describes the data-cleaning process, and its 
consequences for the estimation sample, in more detail. 
2.1.4 Descriptive statistics 
While the data report decisions made by customers regarding plan choices at a daily level, BT 
presents plan prices and ETCs to its customers as a monthly charge. Furthermore, discrete time 
lends itself more easily to the incorporation of time-varying covariates in the econometric 
analysis, like the plan/contract a BT customer is on and the price they pay. As such, we 
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 The three most common plans were Unlimited Weekend Plan (UWP), Unlimited Evenings and Weekend Plan (UEWP), 
and Unlimited Anytime Plan (UAP) 
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aggregate the data to the level of the month and analyze switching behaviour on a monthly 
basis. Such aggregation (called “grouping”) is common in the analysis of duration data. 
We then construct a panel dataset in which an observation corresponds to an individual (a BT 
customer) in a time period (a month). For every individual in every time period, a binary 
outcome variable (which we will call Switchit) indicates whether an individual has decided to 
continue with BT into the next month (Switchit = 0) or to leave BT by the end of this month 
(Switchit = 1). If a customer remains with BT for all 15 months in our sample period, then Switchit 
will simply be a sequence of 15 zeros. In this case, we say the data are censored and define 
censoredit = 1 for all 15 t’s for that i. If a customer switched from BT during the sample period, 
then Switchit will be a sequence of zeros followed by a 1 in the month that they switched. In this 
case, censoredit = 0 for as many time periods as i is in the data. This data structure allows us to 
apply discrete-choice panel data methods to analyze switching, as described in the next section. 
Excluding a very small number of observations regarding customers on 18-month rollover 
contracts yielded our estimation dataset of 1,984,270 monthly observations on 144,849 
customers. 
Table 1 below reports descriptive statistics for the key variables used in our analysis. Unless 
otherwise noted, sample means and standard deviations are measured in percentages ranging 
from 0 to 100. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the estimation sample 
 All observations Obs. In the first month 
Variable Obs. Mean  St. Dev. Obs. Mean  St. Dev. 
Switch 1,984,270 1.2% 11.1% 144,849 1.2% 10.8% 
Time period (1-15) 1,984,270 7.8 4.3    
Censored     144,849 82.9% 37.6% 
Tenure at BT (in years) 1,984,270 10.9 10.6 144,849 9.9 10.5 
Tenure on promotion (in years) 1,984,270 3.4 4.6 144,849 3.1 4.4 
First promotion 1,984,270 34.1% 47.4% 144,849 38.1% 48.6% 
Months to end of MCP 1,984,270 1.9 3.3 144,849 1.7 3.1 
UWP plan 1,984,270 48.4% 50.0% 144,849 52.5% 49.9% 
UEWP plan 1,984,270 38.7% 48.7% 144,849 36.4% 48.1% 
UAP plan 1,984,270 12.9% 33.5% 144,849 11.2% 31.5% 
Standard contract 1,984,270 65.0% 47.7% 144,849 68.1% 46.6% 
Fixed-term contract 1,984,270 3.7% 18.9% 144,849 4.6% 21.0% 
Rollover contract 1,984,270 31.2% 46.3% 144,849 27.3% 44.5% 
F&F mobile 1,984,270 3.9% 19.4% 144,849 1.6% 12.4% 
F&F international 1,984,270 0.2% 4.3% 144,849 0.1% 3.2% 
Broadband     144,849 24.5% 43.0% 
BT Vision    144,849 2.6% 15.8% 
Source: Own calculations based on BT data. 
Notes: This table contains descriptive statistics for the sample of data used in our analysis.  An observation is a customer-
month, i.e. information about a given BT customer in a given month.  There are 144,849 customers and as many as 15 
months per customer (January 2009 to March 2010).  The first group of columns (“All observations”) reports descriptive 
statistics across all customers and months. The second group of columns (“Obs. In the first month”) reports descriptive 
statistics across customers in the first month (January 2009). “Switch” indicates the event of switching away from BT. 
“Censored” indicates whether a household in the sample is still a BT customer at the end of the observation period. A 
promotion is defined as a combination of plan, contract, price, and additional phone services (if any). MCP stands for 
Minimum Contract Period.  UWP, UEWP, and UAP are BT calling plans. F&F mobile/F&F international/Broadband/BT 
Vision are other BT services that customers may be purchasing in addition to fixed voice telephone service.  We only 
observe this at the time of the first month. 
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The first set of columns in the table reports descriptive statistics across customer-months.14 The 
second set of columns reports descriptive statistics across customers in the first month of the 
observation period (January 2009). 
The first row of Table 1 shows that, on average, 1.2% of BT customers switch away in a given 
month. This corresponds to an annual switching rate of 13.9%.15 As a result, 82.9% of customers 
are censored (i.e. still a BT customer at the end of the observation period). Figure 1 below 
demonstrates the attrition occurring in the sample as customers switch away from BT and also 
shows the share of the customers that remain that subscribe to a standard, fixed-term, or 
rollover contract. 
Figure 1: Number of customers by contract type and month in the observation period 
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Source: Own calculations based on BT data.  
At the beginning of the sample period, the average customer in the data has been with BT for 
almost 10 years and has been on their sampling-date promotion (i.e. plan, contract, and price) 
for just over 3 years. Figure 2 reports other patterns in the data relating to tenure. First, it 
shows the tenure with BT during the first observation month (Jan 2009) for all the customers in 
the data. While most customers have been with BT for less than a decade, there are some 
customers in the database that have been with BT for over 75 years!16 The figure also splits out 
the contract type for each of these customers. As might be expected, rollover and fixed-term 
contracts are relatively more common among customers new to BT. That being said, some even 
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 An observation in the full dataset provides information about a given customer in a given month.  We therefore call any 
such observations a customer-month. 
15
 Calculated as 1-[(1-Switch)^12] and expressed as a percentage. 
16
 These are very few of course. Only ¼ of 1% of households in the sample have been with BT for more than 50 years. 
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very long-standing BT customers have adopted them. This is consistent with BT’s having 
promoted rollover contracts to both new customers and their existing installed base. 
Figure 2: Number of customers by contract type and account start year 
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Source: Own calculations based on BT data. 
Notes: The number of customers and their distribution over start years by contract types is as of the first observation 
month (January 2009).  
Continuing along the rows of Table 1, we see that the majority of BT customers (52.5%) are on 
the baseline, Unlimited Weekend minutes (UWP), plan at the beginning of the sample period, 
with 36.4% on the Unlimited Evening and Weekend minutes (UEWP) and 11.1% on the Unlimited 
Anytime minutes (UAP) plan.  
The majority of BT customers (68.1%) are on a standard (flexible) contract at the beginning of 
the observation period, with 27.3% on rollover contracts and 4.6% on fixed-term contracts. 
Comparing to the full sample (and Figure 1), we see that rollover contracts become more 
prevalent over the sample period. Figure 3 develops this idea more fully. It reports the number 
of customers on contracts of various types by the first month of their current “promotion” (i.e. 
plan, contract, and price).17 The figure shows that fixed-term contracts were first introduced in 
October 2007 and rollover contracts soon followed in February 2008. The high share of rollover 
customers from that date also shows BT’s emphasis on promoting rollover contracts once they 
were introduced. Recall our sampling date is December 31, 2008, so the customer numbers drop 
slightly from January 2009 as all new promotion starts from that date are existing BT customers 
migrating to new contracts. 
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 We build Figure 3 using the contract held by the household in the final month they are observed in our data. 
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Figure 3: Number of customers by contract type and promotion start month 
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Source: Own calculations based on BT data. 
Notes: The number of customers and their distribution over promotion start month by contract types is as of the last 
observation month (March 2010). Customers whose promotion started before January 2007 are dropped. A promotion is 
defined as a combination of plan, contract, price, and additional phone services (if any). 
While BT offers 3 general types of contracts (standard/none, fixed-term, and rollover), many 
different promotions (i.e. plan, contract, and price) were offered to households in the data that 
contained the same type of contract.  This is important for the analysis because different 
promotions had different discounts (and/or discounts that lasted for differing numbers of months 
within a MCP).  This variation provides valuable information to identify the effects of price 
discounts on switching behaviour.   
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Figure 4: Number of customers by fixed term-contract promotion and month in the observation period 
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Source: Own calculations based on BT data. 
Notes: A promotion is defined as a combination of plan, contract, price, and additional phone services (if any). In this 
graph we focus on promotions featuring a fixed-term contract. “Offer B” and “Offer A” are promotions on a UEWP plan. 
“Offer D” and “Offer J” are promotions on a UAP plan. “Offer C” is available on all plan types.  See text for details of 
specific promotions. 
Figure 4 and Figure 5 describe the types of promotions BT offered on fixed-term (Figure 4) and 
rollover (Figure 5) contracts.18  For example, Figure 4 shows that, at the beginning of the 
observation period, the most prevalent fixed-term promotion was “Offer D”, which is a 
promotion with a UAP plan, a 12-month MCP, and a price discount on the corresponding standard 
plan during the first 3 months. “Offer A”, the second most popular fixed-term promotion at the 
beginning of the observation period, is a promotion with a UEWP plan, an 18-month MCP, and a 
price discount on the corresponding standard plan during the first 12 months. Figure 4 also shows 
that “Offer J”, which was introduced in July 2009, has rapidly gained ground. 
 
                                                 
 
 
18
 In conducting the analysis, we had access to the internal name used by BT for each promotion.  They considered this 
confidential business information, however, so in the paper we simply identify them as "Offer A", "Offer B", etc. 
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Figure 5: Number of customers by rollover-contract promotion and month in the observation period 
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Source: Own calculations based on BT data. 
Notes: A promotion is defined as a combination of plan, contract, price, and additional phone services (if any). In this 
graph we focus on promotions featuring a rollover contract. “Offer H” and “Offer F” are promotions on a UEWP plan. 
“Offer G” is a promotion on a UAP plan. “Offer K” is available on all plan types. 
Figure 5 shows that the distribution of customers over rollover promotions is much more 
concentrated than for fixed-term promotions.  By far the most popular rollover promotion is 
“Offer F”, which consists of a UEWP plan at the price of a standard UWP plan (a £2.99 discount) 
and a 12-month automatically renewable contract. 
2.1.5 Switching patterns in the BT data 
The extent to which customers on rollover contracts are more or less likely to switch away from 
BT will be critical to our analysis in this report. As such, we now present the raw patterns in the 
data that we will later refine, analyze, and interpret with our econometric analysis. 
We begin by defining the timing of switching. In both the figures and analysis to follow, we 
define switching in month t to mean that month t will be a customer’s last month of service with 
BT, i.e. they have decided to switch away from BT at the end of month t.19 
Figure 6 presents the differences in switching rates by contract types depending on the month 
someone is in their existing contract.20 The vast majority of customers (96.5%) on either fixed-
                                                 
 
 
19
 Throughout this report, we refer to switching as switching away from BT, not switching between different promotions 
(i.e. plans, contracts, and/or prices) within BT (about 1.5% of customer-months involved the latter kind of switching)  As 
we are most concerned with the competitive effects of BT’s rollover contracts, we chose not to focus on within-BT 
switches of plans or contracts. 
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term or rollover contracts have a 12-month MCP during which they must pay ETCs in order to 
switch away from BT.21 Furthermore, the magnitude of the ETC depends on the number of months 
remaining in their MCP. These effects are evident in the data with reduced (but increasing) 
switching rates for fixed-term and rollover contract customers relative to standard-contract 
customers in the first 11 months of their MCP. In the 12th month (i.e. at the end of the 12th 
month), switching rates for both fixed-term and rollover customers jump as they no longer have 
to pay an ETC in order to switch. After month 12, the majority of fixed-term contracts are 
identical to standard contracts:22 customers pay the undiscounted rate for whatever plan they 
are on and can leave in any month without paying an ETC. By contrast, rollover contract 
customers enter a new MCP beginning in month 13 and must again pay ETCs in order to switch. 
These patterns show up in post-month-13 switching rates: they are broadly similar for standard 
and fixed-term customers and lower for rollover customers.23 There is a similar, but smaller, spike 
in switching for rollover customers ending their second MCP in month 24.  
                                                                                                                                                   
 
 
20
 For confidentiality reasons, we are not able to report the units on the y-axis in this figure. We note, however, that 
across all customers and months in the sample, the average switching rate is 1.2% (cf. Table 1). 
21
 The remaining customers have an 18-month MCP. 
22
 The other fixed-term contracts have a longer, 18-month, MCP – whose existence is also visible in Figure 6. 
23
 While post-month-13 switching rates are lower for customers on rollover compared to fixed-term and standard 
contracts, they are not as low as for customers on rollover contracts in their first MCP. We hypothesize that this may be 
due to greater leniency offered by BT on ETCs in MCPs after the first.  We further explore this idea in Appendix 2 of the 
original report, available as part of Annex 7 to Ofcom’s consultation. 
 16 
 
Figure 6: Switching rates by contract type and tenure on promotion  
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Source: Own calculations based on BT data. 
Notes: Switching is defined as the event of switching away from BT.  A promotion is defined as a combination of plan, 
contract, price, and additional phone services (if any). See Appendix 4 of the original report, available as part of Annex 7 
to Ofcom’s consultation. It is assumed that switches occurring up to 370 days after the promotion start date occurred 
within the twelfth month on the promotion. 
Figure 7 presents the same figure as that above, but split between old (panel above) and new 
(panel below) customers.24 While, for confidentiality reasons, we cannot compare the overall 
level of switching between old and new customers, the figure demonstrates that the impact of 
rollover contracts is similar: both types of customers switch less when on rollover contracts. 
Similar patterns obtain across all tenures in the data. 
                                                 
 
 
24
 A new customer is defined as one whose BT start date is no more than 15 days earlier than her promotion start date. 
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Figure 7: Switching rates by contract type and tenure on promotion, for existing and new customers 
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Source: Own calculations based on BT data. 
Notes: The left hand-side graph refers to existing customers, the right hand-side graph to new customers. Switching is 
defined as the event of switching away from BT.  A promotion is defined as a combination of plan, contract, price, and 
additional phone services (if any). New customers are defined as customers whose account start date is no more than 15 
days earlier than their promotion start date. It is assumed that switches occurring up to 370 days after the promotion 
start date occurred within the twelfth month on the promotion. 
2.2 Other (aggregate) data 
We augmented the disaggregate BT customer-level data with aggregate data on several other 
factors thought to influence switching.  
The most important of the additional aggregate information were the prices charged by rival CPs 
for comparable fixed-line products. There are four primary competitors in this market: BT, Virgin 
Media, TalkTalk (Carphone Warehouse), and Sky.25 There are two standardized products offered 
by all major CPs for fixed-line telephony services: Free Evening and Weekend Calls and Free 
Anytime (UK) Calls. TalkTalk and Virgin used to also offer a Free Weekend Calls product, but 
Virgin and TalkTalk withdrew this product from the market in August and December 2008, 
respectively.  BT continues to offer an Unlimited Weekend Plan. 
Aggregate price data were purchased on our behalf by Ofcom from PurePricing for the 
observation period of January 2009 until March 2010. Reported were the prices for each of the 
main CPs (including BT) for each of the fixed-line voice services described above.   
Standard plan prices for BT on its own and/or compared to rival CPs changed little over time.  As 
described further in Section 4.1.3 below, we investigated the relative importance of this 
variation compared to other types of price variation in identifying the effects of price discounts 
                                                 
 
 
25
 Ofcom (2009a), Figure 4.1 and page 32. 
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and found variation in BT's and other CPs' prices are relatively unimportant in determining our 
results.  As such, in the interests of space we omit here a detailed description of this variation.26 
Finally, aggregate macroeconomic variables (i.e. the unemployment rate) by month and region 
were provided by the UK’s Office for National Statistics.27 
                                                 
 
 
26
 Interested readers may learn more by examining Section 2.2 in Annex 7 to Ofcom’s consultation. 
27
 The regions include England’s Government Office Regions, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. 
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3 Econometric model 
3.1 Switching 
We analyze the impact of BT’s rollover contracts using a discrete-choice panel-data model of 
consumer switching behaviour. We begin our exposition of the econometric model under the 
assumption that there is no self-selection of households into rollover contracts. In the next 
subsection, we generalize the econometric model to account for this possibility. 
As described in the data section above, our data consists of 1,984,406 monthly observations on 
144,861 BT customers. Let i index households and t index months. For each household i in month 
t, define Switchit = 1 if they switched away from BT by the end of that month (and zero 
otherwise). The values of Switchit for each household i in the dataset are either a sequence of 15 
zeros (if they are still with BT at the end of the observation period) or a sequence of zeros 
followed by a 1 (in the month they left BT). 
Let  
ititit xS εβ += '*                                                                ( 1 ) 
be the latent utility to household i from switching in period t. xit and itε  are factors influencing 
the decision to switch plans; xit are observable and itε  is unobservable. We discuss the key 
elements of xit in what follows below. 
Let  
 
 
We assume that itε  is distributed as a Standard Normal random variable, implying P(Switchit) has 
the Probit form: 
∫ ∞−=Φ= βφβ
'
)()()( ' it
x
itit dssxSwitchP                                                ( 2 ) 
where )(Φφ  is the Standard Normal probability (cumulative) distribution function. 
3.1.1 Model specification 
Our primary focus is to measure the effect of the introduction of BT’s rollover contract on the 
incidence of households switching away from BT. We write this as 
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543210 βββββββ ititititititit xpcontractMCPplantenureSwitchP ++++++Φ=  ( 3 ) 
where tenureit includes various measures of household i's tenure in month t (both with BT and on 
a given promotion), planit includes dummies for the various plans offered by BT, MCPit includes 
measures of whether household i is in a MCP, contractit includes dummies for the various 
contracts offered by BT (including, critically, one for rollover contracts), and pit includes 
measures of relative price differences across plans and providers. Xit includes other factors that 
might influence switching behaviour, including other BT services purchased by household i, time 
dummies, and macroeconomic variables.  The specific identities of the variables included in this 
equation are further described in Section 44 below. 
If we can consistently estimate the parameters in Equation (3), then the parameter on the 
indicator for rollover contracts (the relevant component of parameter vector 4β ) will estimate 
the causal effect of BT’s rollover contracts on the probability a household switches away from 
BT, controlling for the discount offered on such plans ( 5β ) and the length of time a household 
has been on a plan ( 1β ). Descriptive statistics for the variables included in the model were given 
in Table 1. 
3.2 Self-selection into rollover contracts 
It is reasonable to assume that households differ in their willingness to switch from BT in a given 
month. Indeed this is one of the sources of randomness captured by the random shock, itε , in 
(1). It is possible, however, that households that are less likely to switch are also more likely to 
choose a rollover contract. This might happen because they value the lower price associated 
with rollover contracts and don’t mind that this means higher costs to switching providers. They 
may be quite happy with BT and are happy to both pay less and stay with them.  
In the presence of selection, household i's choice of a rollover contract is (negatively) correlated 
with their willingness to switch, itε , and the MLE estimate of 4β will be inconsistent and biased 
downward. As this would cause us to overestimate the effect of rollover contracts on switching, 
it is clearly a cause for concern. 
Accommodating discrete right-hand-side endogenous variables (the decision to enrol in/remain 
on a rollover contract) is challenging when both the dependent variable (switching) and 
endogenous explanatory variable (rollover) are themselves discrete (e.g., Wooldridge, 2002). 
Methods commonly used for continuous dependent and/or explanatory variables like 
Instrumental Variables (IV) estimation are not typically available. One is usually forced to make 
stronger assumptions and to jointly model both decisions. 
We follow that approach here. We jointly estimate a switching equation (Equation (3) above) as 
well as a “selection equation” estimating household i's choice of a rollover contract in month t. 
Following notation analogous to that above, let  
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be the latent utility to household i from choosing a rollover contract in period t. xit-1 ( 1−itη ) are 
observable (unobservable) factors influencing the decision to select a rollover contract in period 
t-1 and zt are observable factors that influence such decisions in period t. We discuss the key 
elements of xit-1 and zit in what follows below. 
There is an important difference in the specification of the switching equation (3) and the 
rollover equation (4) in that the latter includes lagged variables. This difference is due to 
differences in the timing of decisions in the model. To understand these differences, consider a 
BT customer in a rollover contract at the beginning of time period t-1 and let xit-1 measure 
information about their “state” at the beginning of the period (e.g. their plan, their contract, 
etc.). During period t-1, if they decide to stay with BT, they must further decide what plan and 
contract to select for period t. Whether they are in a rollover contract in period t clearly 
depends on xit-1. For example, whether they remain on a rollover contract in February 2009 is 
strongly influenced by whether January 2009 is the last month of their MCP. 
The switching decision, on the other hand, is defined to happen at the end of the current  
month. Thus the switching decision in month t depends on period-t state variables, xit, (as in 
equation (3)) while the rollover decision depends on period t-1 state variables, xit-1.
28 We include 
other, period t covariates, zit, in the rollover equation to allow for some period-t effects on 
rollover choices (e.g. time dummies). 
The goal of the rollover equation is to predict whether a household enters a rollover contract. 
The difference in timing of the switching and rollover decisions helps us identify candidate 
instruments that influence the rollover decision but not the switching decision (cf. Wooldridge, 
2002).  This helps motivate the identification of our causal effects of interest. In practice, 
any/all of the period-t covariates entering the switching equation, xit, could enter (with lags) in 
the rollover equation. In practice, we include lags of the contract and plan variables and time 
dummies.29  
Let  
 
 
We will assume itε  and 1−itη are distributed as a joint normal random variable independent of all 
the exogenous variables in both models with correlation coefficient ρ . If, as we suspect, 
unobserved differences in households’ willingness to switch from BT are negatively correlated 
with their choice of rollover contracts, this will result in a statistically significant, negative 
estimate of ρ .  
                                                 
 
 
28
 An alternative notational convention would be to define all states to occur at the beginning of each period. In this 
case, we would say someone switching in period t would have St+1 = 1 and there would be a similar lagged relationship 
between outcomes and covariates in both equations. 
29
 The qualitative results were largely insensitive to the exact variables included in the rollover equation. 
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Formally, the model is a recursive bivariate probit (Greene, 2008, Section 23.8.4, page 823; 
Maddala, 1983, p.123).  Following the notation in Greene (2008), the estimating equation is then 
),,(),( 21 ρδγβ XRolloverXRolloverSwitchP ittitit +Φ=  
where itt RolloverX γβ +1 are the covariates in the Switching equation (with the Rollover term 
pulled out), δ2X are the covariates in the Rollover (selection) equation, Φ  is a standard 
bivariate normal random variable with the variance of itε  and 1−itη each normalized to 1 and ρ measuring their correlation.  We estimate it by Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) using 
Stata, allowing arbitrary serial correlation within individuals over time, so-called “clustered” 
standard errors. 
 
3.2.1 Discussion 
There are a number of assumptions implicit in the econometric model specified in this section 
that warrant further discussion. 
First, note that the model presented here is a simplified version of a more general, dynamic, 
model that analyzes a household’s choice of plans, j, among all plans available in the market in 
month t. In such a model, a household switches when the present discounted value of her utility 
to the new plan, k¸ exceeds that of her utility to her existing plan, j.30 Unfortunately, estimating 
a dynamic model of plan choice requires both more detailed data (especially regarding the 
providers and plans households leaving BT switch into) as well as significantly more researcher 
and computation time. Such models are at the frontier of applied micro-econometric research 
and are beyond the scope of this study. We have included some dynamics by exploiting the 
differences in timing in the selection and rollover equations. While our model may not allow us 
to jointly analyze the optimal sequence of household rollover and switching decisions, it is likely 
to be adequate for measuring the average effect of rollovers on switching. 
A second important assumption is that of no persistent unobserved individual heterogeneity, e.g. 
that the error in the switching equation cannot be written as itiit c εε ~+= . Allowing for 
unobserved heterogeneity is a hallmark of linear panel data estimation (e.g. fixed-effects 
models), but it is significantly more complicated in a discrete-choice (and thus nonlinear) 
setting. It is possible to do fixed-effects logit estimation in some settings by conditioning on the 
set of observations with a given number of outcomes (switches). In our case, however, every 
household either switches or doesn’t (the sum of their binary outcomes over time is either 0 or 
1) and, if they do switch, it is always in the last period of the data. Furthermore, as many 
households do not change contracts in the data, we would have to rely on the much smaller set 
of BT customers who switch plans within our observation period. Similarly, estimating a random-
effects model (e.g. a random-effects probit) either requires making untenable assumptions about 
the distribution of the random effect (e.g. unobserved tastes, ic , are independent of the 
explanatory variables, including tenure) or coding an appropriate estimation procedure. Such 
                                                 
 
 
30
 This complicated dynamic model could even itself be augmented to account for “behavioural” effects (e.g. context 
effects, default bias) typically missing from a dynamic utility-maximizing framework. 
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models are also at the frontier of applied micro-econometric research and also beyond the scope 
of this study. 
Regardless, we feel unobserved heterogeneity in the switching equation is unlikely to bias our 
results in ways we could predict. The primary bias from any time-persistent unobservables is 
likely to most be felt by the tenure variables.31 The tenure variables aren’t the focus of our 
study, however. While bias or inconsistency in any single parameter generally contaminates the 
estimates of all other parameters, assigning any such “transmitted bias” to our rollover 
coefficient is difficult. While it is too strong to say unobserved heterogeneity is clearly not a 
problem, neither is it true to say that it would obviously bias the effects of rollover contracts on 
switching one way or another. 
A final concern is that unmodelled dynamics or unobserved heterogeneity could influence the 
legitimacy of our self-selection correction. For example, there could exist indexes of unobserved 
heterogeneity in both rollover and selection equations that are negatively correlated with each 
other. The tenure variable and lagged contract variables in the switching and rollover equations, 
respectively, could (unintentionally) capture these effects, muting our estimates of that 
correlation. In our opinion, this is the area of greatest concern with our proposed modelling 
framework, and so we conduct a specification test to assess the possibility of such effects after 
presenting our baseline results. 
                                                 
 
 
31
 Unobserved heterogeneity bias makes it difficult to disentangle whether long-time BT customers switch less because 
they simply like BT (unobserved heterogeneity) or because being with BT in any single period makes them want to switch 
less in the following period (so-called state dependence). 
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4 Results 
4.1 Specifications 
4.1.1 Switching equation 
We considered a number of specifications of the switching equation based on the econometric 
model outlined in the last section. In the final specification below, we included the following 
variables: 
Macroeconomic Variables: As switching can be driven by macroeconomic factors unrelated to 
the issues analyzed here, we include two controls for macroeconomic effects: (1) The 
unemployment rate (varying by both region and month) and (2) Month dummies for the 15 
months in our sample.  We chose not to report these variables due to space constraints. 
Tenure: As shown in Figure 2 and Figure 7, customers in the data differ considerably in their 
tenure with BT and this tenure is strongly (negatively) correlated with switching rates. We 
include three measures of tenure: (1) log of the household’s tenure with BT (in months), (2) log 
of the household’s tenure on their current promotion (i.e., contract, plan, and discount; in 
months), and (3) whether or not they are a new customer, defined as a customer whose BT start 
date is no more than 15 days earlier than her promotion start date. 
Plan Dummies: As certain plans may be more or less attractive to households (and because when 
we introduce prices we want to account for differences in the amount of calls services provided), 
we include plan dummies to measure these effects. The included dummies are two: (1) the 
Unlimited Evening and Weekend Plan and (2) the Unlimited Anytime Plan. The Unlimited 
Weekend Plan is the excluded plan. 
Other Product Dummies: We were able to obtain information about other BT products being 
purchased by each BT household at the time of the sampling date. These were BT’s Broadband 
Service and BT Vision (Multi-channel TV service). We include these as households may be less 
likely to switch if they also subscribe to one of these products due to higher perceived benefits 
from staying with BT and/or higher perceived switching costs from leaving BT. Furthermore, we 
include indicators for the additional calls services which, throughout the observation period, are 
associated with some promotions: these add-on packages for calls to mobile phones and 
international calls are called Friends & Family Mobile, and Friends & Family International. 
Month in initial MCP: Over 96% of customers on fixed-term or rollover contracts sign up for a 12-
month Minimum Contract Period. For these customers, we included dummies indicating in which 
month of their first MCP is each observed month.32 This will measure the impact of households 
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 Not reported are separate effects for customers on 18-month contracts. 
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having to pay ETCs in order to switch from BT. As ETCs are higher the more months remaining in 
a MCP, we expect this effect to be strongest for months early in the MCP. To isolate the effects of 
MCPs on rollover contracts versus fixed-term contracts, we measure these effects in just the first 
12 months of a household’s contract. After this 12-month period, fixed-term and rollover 
contracts are very different: the former have no contractual restrictions (but do have higher 
prices) compared to the latter. After being unable to reject their difference, the Month-in-initial-
MCP dummies were constrained to be the same for customers on fixed-term contracts and 
customers on rollover contracts in their initial MCP.33 
Fixed-term Contract Dummy (Post-MCP): The Month-in-initial-MCP dummies capture the impact 
of being in a particular month of the (first) 12-month MCP on switching behaviour for fixed-term 
customers. After those 12 months, we include a single dummy to measure any subsequent 
differences in switching behaviour between customers who were originally on a fixed-term 
contract but no longer face contractual restrictions relative to those households who were never 
on a term contract. 
Rollover Dummy (Post-MCP): The Month-in-initial-MCP dummies also capture the impact of being 
in a particular month of the first 12-month MCP on household switching behaviour for rollover 
customers. After those 12 months, we include a single dummy to measure any subsequent 
differences in switching behaviour between customers who were originally on a rollover 
contract. As rollover-contract households are the only types of households that face ETCs under 
their new MCP, we expect their switching rates to be lower than other customers.34 
Price Difference (Some specifications): In all but our first specification, we also control for 
price effects. We do so by including, for each household, the difference between the price they 
pay for their chosen plan (net of any price discount they might benefit from) and the lowest 
price in the market for that same plan at rival providers TalkTalk and/or Virgin.35 We expect that 
the higher is BT’s price in the market relative to its rivals, the more likely it is for households to 
switch. As defined, this variable will also capture changes in the price paid by households for 
their chosen BT plan as any price discounts are removed due to the expiration of a promotional 
period. For households on standard and rollover contracts, there is no price change as there 
either is no discount or the discount is effectively permanent. For households on fixed-term 
contracts, this will capture the increase in the price for Evenings and Weekend (similarly 
Anytime) service after the first 3 (similarly 12) months of their MCP. We measure this variable as 
a percentage of the price of the household’s chosen service.36 
The last two (sets of) variables above are our key explanatory variables. The rollover dummy in 
particular measures the extent to which customers on rollover contracts are less likely to switch 
in month 13 onward relative to both standard (un-contracted) and fixed-term customers, 
controlling for the price discount they receive on the service. 
                                                 
 
 
33
 Motivated by the switching patterns we observe in the data, we ignore throughout our analysis the fact that ETCs are 
applicable not only on special offers, but also during the first 12 months of all new accounts. 
34
 Note this post-MCP rollover dummy will measure the impact of both (a) ETCs in subsequent MCPs as well as (b) any 
direct effect of rollover contracts independent of these ETCs.  We discuss this issue in Section 4.2.1 below. 
35
 We elected not to include prices for Sky voice service as these are only available to Sky TV customers, implying the 
price comparison being made by households is not just that for fixed-voice services. 
36
 E.g. price difference = 100*(price – min_rivals_price) / price 
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4.1.2 Rollover (selection) equation 
In our final specification, we also accommodate the possibility of self-selection by jointly 
estimating the switching and rollover equations, (3) and (4). The specification for the switching 
equation is as above. We included the following variables in the rollover equation: 
Lagged Contract/Plan Choices: We include lagged contract and plan dummies to predict the 
choice of rollover contracts in the current month. The lagged dummies included are (1) Plan type 
(Evening & Weekend and Anytime plans, Weekend plan omitted), (2) On a fixed-term contract 
(separately during, and at the end of, and after the end of the MCP), and (3) On a rollover 
contract (separately during and at the end of each rollover period). 
Month Dummies: We include month dummies to capture aggregate trends in subscriptions to 
rollover contracts, e.g. due to variation in BT’s marketing focus and/or expenditure over the 
sample period. 
4.1.3 Identification 
The key effect of interest is the impact of rollover contracts on household switching, controlling 
for tenure, other services purchased by the household, price discounts, and selection. 
Fundamentally the effect of rollover contracts on switching are identified by the patterns shown 
in Figure 6 and Figure 7: how often do households on rollover contracts switch after their MCP 
relative to both fixed-term and standard contracts. The data suggested they switch less, a result 
the econometric analysis confirms. 
Of course, customers who have long been with BT (i.e. have longer tenure) in general switch 
less. We control for that by including the tenure variables described above. The data are rich 
enough to, in principle, flexibly estimate the impact of rollover contracts for households at each 
possible tenure (e.g. customers that have been with BT for 0, 1, 2, etc. years). We have done 
this and found the effect of tenure is well-captured by the log(tenure) specification above and 
for parsimony simply report those results. 
Customers on rollover contracts also receive price discounts. Failing to account for these 
discounts will tend to attribute a lack of switching to the presence of the rollover contract 
instead of the lower price being paid by households. We account for this by estimating the effect 
lower monthly prices have on switching rates, controlling for contract and plan characteristics.  
The variation in the data that identifies price effects could, in principle, come from one of three 
sources.  First, it could come from variation over time in the undiscounted standard plan prices 
offered by BT relative to rival CPs.  Second, it could come from variation over time in the level 
of the discount from standard plan prices for fixed-term plans whose discount varies within the 
MCP (e.g. one with a discount of 3 months within a 12-month MCP).  Finally, it could come from 
variation in the level of discount across promotions marketed to and accepted by BT customers 
for fixed-term and/or rollover contracts.   
In results not reported here, we explored the relative importance of these sources of variation 
and found the latter the most important by far.  For example, there are two BT promotions 
(“Offer H” and “Offer K”) that, for the UEWP plan, appear to be identical except that the former 
has a price discount and the latter does not.  Customer switching is higher for the plan without 
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the discount.  We rely on all of these sources of price variation in estimation, but it should be 
understood that the latter is the most important for identification.37   
Finally we wish to control for selection into rollover contracts based on unobservable differences 
in willingness to switch that are correlated with tastes for key characteristics of rollover 
contracts (such as lower prices in exchange for greater restrictions on churn). As further 
discussed in Section 3.2, the selection model will have power to the extent we have identified 
instruments that can influence the choice of rollover contracts and not switching. Exogenous 
variation in the instruments will exogenously “move rollover” and identify the causal effect of 
rollover contracts on switching. Correlation in the deviations in the predicted from the actual 
switching and the predicted and actual rollover will then identify the correlation in the 
unobservables in the two equations. 
4.2 Results 
Table 2 below presents the results of the switching regressions under three specifications. The 
first specification measures the effect of rollover contracts on switching behaviour but does not 
account for either the effects of the price discounts or selection into rollover contracts. This 
specification is closest in spirit to the patterns presented in the raw data in Section 2.1.5. The 
second specification includes the price effects described above. The third specification accounts 
for self-selection into rollover contracts.  We present in the table only the results for the 
switching equation.  Results for the Rollover equation are presented in Appendix 1. 
The estimates in the table report the marginal effects of the variables at left on the probability 
of switching away from BT in a given month, measured as a percentage point. The predicted 
switching rate for the average observation in our dataset (reported in the last set of rows) is 
slightly below 1.0% per month. This corresponds to something slightly below 11% per year. 
Estimates that are significant at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level are reported with 1, 2, and 3 stars. 
As an example of how to read the table, consider the switching rates for the Evening and 
Weekend plan (denoted UEWP). Switching is an estimated 0.05 percentage points higher on the 
Evening and Weekend plan than for the Weekend only plan (the excluded category), or 5.3% of 
the baseline 0.95% switching rate.38 This is a relatively small effect. 
We begin by considering the results of tenure, plan characteristics, other services, and month in 
the MCP in the baseline specification (Column 1). All are consistent with prior expectation as 
well as the patterns described in the data section. 
Tenure is shown to strongly influence the probability a household switches. Long-standing BT 
households switch much less. For example, a household who has been with BT for 4 years and 
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 Interested readers may learn more by reading the supplementary report we prepared for Ofcom, available as Annex 8 
to Ofcom's consultation. 
38
 For consistency, we evaluate the percentage effect of a change in any explanatory variable at the predicted switching 
probability evaluated at the mean of the data. As can be seen at the bottom of the table, this differs slightly from the 
average predicted probability in the data.  
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increases its tenure by 100% (to 8 years) is predicted to switch with a 0.59 percentage-point 
lower probability, over 60% of the average baseline switching rate. Tenure on a particular 
promotion (i.e. plan, contract, and price) is also associated with lower switching rates.  
Subscribing to another BT service had mixed effects on switching. The largest effect, both 
economically and statistically, was for the purchase of BT broadband service. Households that 
were purchasing broadband at the sampling date had a 0.49 percentage point lower switching 
rate, just over half of the average baseline rate.39 This is consistent with operators’ views that 
providing bundles of telecommunications services to households may reduce their willingness to 
switch.  The unemployment rate and month dummies (not reported) both influence switching, 
with higher levels of unemployment associated with greater departures from BT. 
The effects of being on a MCP are very strong and consistent with expectation. Being in the first 
month of an MCP is associated with a 0.89 percentage point reduction in the predicted 
probability of switching, over 90% of the baseline rate! Moving closer to the end of the MCP 
increases this likelihood, although it stays significantly below the baseline until the very last 
month, month 12. Here, in the first month in which households with MCPs can switch without 
penalty, there is a very large (0.64 percentage point, almost 70% of the baseline) increase in the 
predicted probability of switching. This demonstrates the importance of MCPs (and the ETCs 
associated with them) in limiting household switching behaviour. 
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 Of the remaining services analyzed, the effect of F&F Mobile was modest (reducing switching by an estimated 12.7%), 
while the effects of the others (BT Vision and F&F International) were not statistically different from zero. 
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Table 2: Main marginal effects in the benchmark regressions 
 Switching 
 Probit Probit Bivariate probit 
Variable Without prices 
With 
prices 
With prices and self-
selection 
Log(Tenure at BT) -0.59*** -0.59*** -0.59*** 
Log(Tenure on promotion) -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.17*** 
Broadband -0.49*** -0.50*** -0.50*** 
BT Vision 0.09* 0.09 0.09 
F&F mobile -0.08* -0.13** -0.12** 
F&F international 0.15 -0.067 -0.061 
UEWP 0.05* 0.09*** 0.08*** 
UAP -0.25*** -0.31*** -0.31*** 
Initial MCP month 1  -0.89*** -0.86*** -0.79*** 
Initial MCP month 2 -0.84*** -0.79*** -0.79*** 
Initial MCP month 3 -0.80*** -0.74*** -0.73*** 
Initial MCP month 4 -0.75*** -0.68*** -0.67*** 
Initial MCP month 5 -0.71*** -0.63*** -0.62*** 
Initial MCP month 6 -0.61*** -0.51*** -0.50*** 
Initial MCP month 7 -0.65*** -0.56*** -0.55*** 
Initial MCP month 8 -0.53*** -0.41*** -0.40*** 
Initial MCP month 9 -0.50*** -0.38*** -0.37*** 
Initial MCP month 10 -0.47*** -0.33*** -0.32*** 
Initial MCP month 11 -0.45*** -0.31*** -0.31*** 
Initial MCP month 12 0.64*** 0.99*** 1.01*** 
12-month fixed-term after end of MCP 0.39*** 0.41*** 0.42*** 
Rollover in subsequent MCP(s) -0.49*** -0.34*** -0.33*** 
Percentage price difference from rivals  0.01*** 0.01*** 
Rho (corr. coeff.)   -0.06*** 
Average predicted switching 1.25% 1.25% 1.24% 
Predicted switching for the average 
observation 0.95% 0.95% 0.95% 
Source: Own calculations based on BT data. 
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 Notes: Reported are the estimated marginal effects for most variables in our Probit switching equation evaluated at the 
mean of the explanatory variables.  Switching means switching fixed voice telephone service away from BT. The first 
column does not control for price differences or self-selection. The second column includes controls for price 
differences.  The third column controls for self-selection by estimating a bivariate probit of the switching and rollover 
equations (Equations (3) and (5)). A promotion is a combination of plan, contract, price, and additional phone services (if 
any). F&F mobile/F&F international/Broadband/BT Vision are dummies for other BT services that customers may be 
purchasing in addition to fixed voice telephone service. UEWP and UAP are BT calling plan dummies.  MCP stands for 
Minimum Contract Period. Percentage price difference from rivals is the price of the household’s chosen service minus 
the minimum price from Virgin & Talk Talk for the comparable voice service, divided by the price of the chosen service. 
Included in all specifications but not reported are a constant term, month dummies, unemployment, and variables 
measuring the effects of 18-month term contracts. Included in the rollover equation in column 3 but not reported here 
(but see 0) are lagged plan dummies and lagged contract choice variables. Estimates significant at 5%/1%/0.1% levels 
denoted by 1/2/3 stars.  Significance levels determined based on standard errors that allow for arbitrary correlation 
across months within each customer. 
4.2.1 The effects of rollover contracts 
Remaining with the results in column 1, we turn to the contract dummies, including our key 
parameters of interest. We see that households on rollover contracts switch after their first MCP 
by 0.49 percentage points (51.7%) less than comparable customers on standard contracts. By 
contrast, households on fixed-term contracts switch 41.2% more than standard-contract 
customers, implying rollover customers switch 65.8% less than fixed-term customers.40 This is no 
doubt due, in part, to the additional ETCs such customers would have to pay compared to either 
standard or fixed-term customers. 
The remaining columns in the table break out the effects of reduced switching by customers on 
fixed-term and rollover contracts into a portion due to prices and that due to the effects of the 
contracts themselves. 
Column 2 demonstrates that price variation significantly influences switching. It says that a 10 
percentage point increase in the monthly price of a fixed-voice service relative to BT’s rivals is 
associated with a 0.11 percentage point increase in the switching rate. Thus the £3 (20.6%) 
discount on Evening and Weekend Service associated with a rollover contract is predicted to 
lower the probability of a household switching by an estimated 0.21 percentage points, 
approximately 22% of the baseline rate. 
Note also that accounting for prices has the predicted effect of reducing the magnitude of the 
Rollover dummy, from -0.49 to -0.34 percentage points. As expected, if we fail to account for the 
lower prices offered on rollover contracts, we attribute too much to the influence of rollover 
contracts to the rollover feature (and associated ETCs). That being said, there is still a negative 
estimated effect of rollover contracts on switching relative to households on standard contracts, 
by 35.9% relative to standard contracts and by 55.3% relative to fixed-term contracts 
The worry is that this effect doesn’t only represent the causal effect of rollover contracts but in 
part captures the self-selection of customers into rollover contracts that are less likely to switch 
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 (-0.49-0.39)/(0.947+0.39)=-0.658. 
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anyway. The last column of Table 2 addresses this issue by presenting the switching regression 
results associated with our Bivariate Probit model including a rollover self-selection equation. 
The effects of selection are both economically and statistically modest. While we do estimate 
that there is a statistically significant negative correlation in the unobservable errors in the 
switching and rollover equations, it is only estimated to be -0.06. As a result, there are few 
differences in the estimated effects of any of the explanatory variables in column 3 versus 
column 2. In this, our final specification, households on rollover contracts switch after their first 
MCP approximately 34.8% less than comparable customers on standard contracts and by 54.8% 
less than comparable customers on fixed-term contracts. 
What do these impacts of rollover contracts on switching imply about switching costs in this 
market?  Because both rollover contracts and percentage price differences between BT and its 
rivals enter the utility to switching from BT, we can easily quantify the switching cost implied by 
our estimates.  For our preferred specification (Table 2, Column 3), rollover contracts reduce 
switching by 0.34 percentage points and the percentage price difference for BT products relative 
to rivals increases switching by 0.01 percentage points at the mean of the explanatory variables. 
The switching costs associated with rollover contract can therefore be measured as the 
percentage price difference for BT relative to its rivals that would make a consumer indifferent 
to taking a rollover contract.  This is just 0.33/0.01 = 33.0%.  In other words, a rival would have 
to offer (in perpetuity) a discount on the price of its fixed line voice service of 33.0% of the BT 
price in order to overcome the average switching costs imposed on households induced by 
rollover contracts.41 
4.2.2 Decomposing the effects of rollover contracts 
The effects of rollover contracts presented thus far aggregate two distinct economic effects that 
each could reduce a household's propensity to switch.  First, rollover contracts introduce 
additional MCPs beyond the first.  These bring with them ETCs that naturally reduce switching.   
Second, rollover contracts could themselves reduce switching, even after controlling for the 
effects of ETCs.  One reason would be that rollover contracts make staying with BT the default 
option and that household decisions could be influenced by default bias.42  This seems 
particularly relevant if there is only a short window in which customers must make a decision to 
switch.43  Another reason would be that opting out of a rollover contract required customers to 
contact BT on a special telephone number, where they were sometimes offered “bespoke” 
retention deals.  By making rollover contracts an opt-out process, BT essentially gave itself the 
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 This value is comparable to previous estimates of the size of switching costs in the literature.  For example, Dube, 
Hitsch, and Rossi (2009) estimate switching costs in the margarine and orange juice markets in the range of 15-60% of the 
purchase price and Shcherbakov (2007) estimates switching costs in the cable and satellite television markets in the 
range of 32-52% of the annualized expenditure on the service. 
42
 Della Vigna (2009) surveys the empirical literature on behavioural biases, including the default bias. Sunstein and 
Thaler (2008) raised the awareness of behavioural biases in the general public.  As discussed earlier, Handel (2010) 
attributes the estimated switching costs in his study to default bias. 
43
 A personal anecdote illustrates such an effect.  While recently travelling abroad, one of the authors was called by his 
energy provider and asked if he wanted to continue service with them.  Renewing meant a new 12-month contract with 
associated ETCs or a switch to a monthly contract with unknown (at the time) prices.  Failing to renew meant a lapse in 
service.  The existing contract was set to expire the next day!  He chose to renew his existing contract. 
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option to offer customized discounts to those households that had expressed an interest in 
switching at the moment of their decision. 
To separate the effects of rollover contracts into its components due to associated ETCs versus 
the contracts themselves is both challenging and beside the point.  It is challenging because it 
requires making strong assumptions about the specific form that monetary values of ETCs 
translate into reduced switching.  This may not be constant across months, MCPs, or 
(unobserved) customer types.44  It is beside the point because the important market consequence 
of rollover contracts is the aggregate effect they have on market outcomes.  It probably doesn't 
matter to a competitor whether BT's customers switch less due to ETCs or the contracts 
themselves; what does matter is that they switch less!45 
4.2.3 Robustness of self-selection correction 
As we are concerned that we have accurately modelled the effects of self-selection, we 
considered several alternative specifications of the rollover equation. Variation in the set of 
lagged covariates had modest effects of the results; in the final specification we included the 
lagged contract variables as described above. 
We also assessed the possibility of bias in our measurement of self-selection due to unobserved 
heterogeneity in the rollover and/or selection equations. The best test would be to estimate an 
unrestricted model that allowed for such unobserved heterogeneity and test the significance of 
this addition. For the computational reasons discussed in Section 3, however, this was not 
possible.  
Instead, we estimated alternative specifications that omitted the tenure variables from the 
switching equation and lagged contract choice variables from the rollover equation. The hope is 
that these specifications remove those variables most likely to be picking up any time-persistent 
unobserved heterogeneity in each equation, allowing those to (re-)enter the error term and be 
estimated in our bivariate probit specification. The results were encouraging. Not only was the 
estimated correlation in this specification not more negative, it was in fact positive. Indeed, 
despite the natural increase in the variability of the estimate due to omitting important 
explanatory factors, large negative values could be rejected.  
Figure 7, showing switching rates by month on promotion for both existing and new BT 
customers,   provides further insight into why we may not be finding evidence of self-selection.  
A reasonable story of self-selection would seem to be that of a loyal BT customer who intends 
not to switch and is happy to enjoy the price discount offered with a rollover contract.  However, 
such households would also seem more likely to be long-time BT customers, something we can 
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 In supplementary results not presented here, for example, we found that ETCs had a very different effect on switching 
during households' first MCP compared to subsequent MCPs.  While this could in part be due to BT (unobservedly) 
forgiving ETCs for customers that didn't realize the nature of rollover contracts, it nonetheless poses a difficult 
interpretation challenge. 
45
 In further results not presented here, we explored separately estimating these effects and found that, controlling for 
ETCs (as measured in the first MCP), rollover contracts reduced switching by 0.14 percentage points, 14.7% of the 0.95% 
predicted switching rate at the mean of the explanatory variables.  Based on the estimated effect of percentage price 
differences in this specification, this implied that the switching costs induced just by rollover contracts is 10.8%, i.e. a 
rival would have to offer (in perpetuity) a discount on the price of its fixed line voice service of 10.8% of the BT price in 
order to overcome the switching costs imposed on households by rollover contracts, supposing such contracts contained 
no associated ETCs. 
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see in the data.  If this story were right, we would expect to see no effect of rollover contracts 
on old customers, but strong effects on new customers.  Figure 7, however, shows that, if 
anything, switching rates for customers on rollover relative to standard contracts are more 
different for existing than new customers, a result confirmed (but not reported) for the full 
model.  For there to be strong effects of self-selection, it must be that customers of a given 
tenure with BT differ in their unobserved willingness to switch that is correlated with their 
choice of a rollover contract.  Put this way, self-selection seems less likely to be an issue, 
something confirmed in our empirical results. 
While not conclusive, the statistical test and analysis above encourage us to conclude that we 
are not underestimating the amount of self-selection in the market. 
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5 Conclusions 
This paper evaluates the effects of automatically renewable (“rollover”) contracts introduced by 
British Telecommunications (BT) on their customers’ willingness to switch suppliers in the UK 
fixed-voice telephone market.  Working closely with Ofcom staff, we obtained detailed 
customer-level billing data from BT for a random sample of almost 180,000 of their fixed-line 
voice customers as of 31 December, 2008 and followed their choices for the subsequent 15 
months.  We augmented this with aggregate market-wide information measuring macroeconomic 
trends and prices offered by rival providers for similar services, yielding a comprehensive dataset 
well-suited to analyze the factors influencing household switching from BT.  Patterns in the raw 
data strongly support the conclusion that households on rollover contracts switch less than those 
on standard and (especially) fixed-term contracts.   
We specified an econometric model to analyze the factors influencing these switching patterns.  
The model was designed to estimate not only the direct, causal, effect of rollover contracts on 
switching away from BT, but also other factors that might influence switching, especially the 
price discounts included in such contracts and “self-selection”, the possibility that there are 
unobserved differences in households’ likelihood of switching that might be correlated with their 
decision to select a rollover contract. 
We found all of these factors were important determinants of households’ switching behaviour.  
In our preferred specification, we found customers respond strongly to facing ETCs in minimum 
contract periods (MCPs):  they switch 83.4% less than the average baseline switching rate in the 
first month of a MCP, with the effect smoothly lessening until the last month (when customers 
can switch without paying ETCs), where it jumps to an estimated 80% greater than baseline.  We 
further found that doubling a household’s tenure with BT, offering a 21% price discount like that 
offered by BT on the most popular rollover contract, and purchasing broadband service from BT 
was associated with an estimated 62.3%, 21.9%, and 52.8% reduction in switching, respectively.  
Finally, we found only modest evidence of self-selection:  unobservable factors influencing 
households selection of rollover contracts were found to be negatively correlated with 
unobservable factors influencing their switching from BT, but the magnitude of this correlation 
was small (-0.06) and its economic effects were negligible. 
Our primary result focused on the effect of rollover contracts on switching.  We found, after 
controlling for the effects of tenure, price discounts, broadband purchase, and self-selection, 
that customers on BT’s rollover contracts switch after their first MCP an estimated 34.8% less 
than comparable customers on standard contracts and by 54.8% less than comparable customers 
on BT’s fixed-term contracts.  These imply rollover contracts induce switching costs on the order 
of 33.0% of the monthly price of the average BT fixed-voice telephone service.   
Two literatures in economics suggest rollover contracts should be viewed with scepticism and 
concern in light of our results.  First, our results suggest that BT’s rollover contracts significantly 
increase switching costs in fixed voice telephony markets.  A likely short-run effect is that these 
switching costs reduce rivals’ incentives to attract customers by cutting prices or promoting their 
own products.  Is this effect outweighed by the benefits of more aggressive competition for 
customers willing to enter such contracts? As they were newly introduced, we weren't able to 
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analyze this question in the UK market.  While they acknowledge that the evidence in the 
economics literature isn’t definitive, Farrell and Klemperer (2007) conclude that it is likely that 
higher switching costs increase average prices and therefore reduce consumer welfare. 
A growing literature analyzing exclusive contracting in product markets provides an additional 
cause for concern.  This literature analyzes the incentives a manufacturer may have to sign 
exclusive contracts with one or more downstream retailers.  When there are economics of scale 
in manufacturing, such contracts can exclude an efficient entrant.46  The essential insight is that 
when any one retailer signs an exclusive deal, it imposes a negative externality on all other 
retailers by reducing the potential market for (and raising the costs of) the new entrant.  This is 
a kind of coordination failure and it can induce all retailers to sign exclusives when they would 
jointly prefer to instead buy from the entrant.   
The implications of this literature for BT’s rollover contracts are analogous.  Rollover contracts 
introduce (rolling, near-) exclusive contracts over a portion of BT’s customer base.47  If, as is 
likely, there are economies of scale in the provision of either existing or new services, this 
reduces the likelihood of either new market entry or the introduction of new services by existing 
rivals, again reducing welfare. 
Can rollover contracts be justified on efficiency grounds?  The most prominent argument in the 
economics literature is that exclusive contracts can solve problems of asymmetric information 
and/or moral hazard,48 but these are unlikely to be relevant where exclusives are with final 
customers.  Arguments that MCPs help lower signup costs may be credible, but presumably only 
for the first MCP, not on a rolling basis.  They clearly could also reduce transactions and 
marketing costs, but at what cost to the competitive process? 
While this paper has exclusively analyzed the impact of BT’s rollover contracts on switching in 
fixed voice telephone markets, the lessons appear to us to be more general.  If similar rollover 
contracts reduce customer switching for access to broadband Internet, energy, or mobile 
telephone service without providing any additional benefits (e.g. a new mobile handset), the 
conclusions we draw for fixed voice would equally well apply to those markets.  Overall, the 
evidence in the economic literature provides few efficiency justifications for rollover contracts 
of the type used by BT and several reasons why they could reduce competition and, by 
inference, social welfare.  They should clearly be a cause for concern for policymakers in all 
markets where they are used. 
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 E.g., Aghion and Bolton (1987), Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wiley (1991), Segal and Whinston (2000).  Whinston (2006), 
Chapter 4 provides a nice introduction to this topic. 
47
 Strictly speaking, rollover contracts are not exclusive.  Like exclusives, however, they impose a cost on consumers 
wishing to buy from another provider. 
48
 See Whinston (2006), Section 4.5. 
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Appendix: Rollover equation 
Table 2, in the main body of the study, reports the marginal effects of a set of covariates on the 
probability of switching, under three alternative specifications. Specifications 1 and 2 are single-
equation (Probit) specifications (without and with controlling for prices, respectively) in which 
only the outcome of switching away from BT is modelled. To address the issue of self-selection 
into rollover contracts, Specification 3 is a two-equation (Bivariate Probit) specification in which 
the switching outcome is modelled together with the outcome of choosing a rollover contract. 
The marginal effects on the probability of choosing a rollover contract, as emerging from the 
estimation of the rollover equation in Specification 3, are reported in Table 3. 
Table 3: Main marginal effects for the rollover equation 
 Switching 
 Bivariate probit 
Variable With prices and self-selection 
Lagged UEWP 9.3*** 
Lagged UAP  -0.2 
Lagged fixed-term  -22.8*** 
Lagged fixed-term during MCP -5.2 
Lagged fixed-term at end of MCP 25.9*** 
Lagged rollover during MCP 98.4*** 
Lagged rollover at end of MCP 77.7*** 
Average predicted switching 31.24% 
Predicted switching for the average observation 23.70% 
Source: Own calculations based on BT data. 
Table 3 shows in particular (variables “Lagged rollover during MCP” and “Lagged rollover at end 
of MCP”) the impact of state dependence, whereby a customer is more likely to remain on a 
rollover contract than she is to move to one. Relative to a customer on a standard UWP plan, a 
customer on a rollover contract and in the middle of an MCP is more likely to “choose” a rollover 
contract (the default option) by over 4 times (98.4/23.7 = 415%). This effect is attenuated for 
rollover customers who are at the end of an MCP and therefore they do not have to pay any ETC 
to move to different contracts.  
